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The World Food Outlook and the Foundation’s Agricultural Activities 
The importance of the Foundation!s work in agriculture has been painfully 
reaffirmed by recent events. After some years of good weather, 1972 brought poor 
crop conditions in most of Asia, resulting in huge Soviet purchases from the United 
States and the using up of India’s crucial carryover stocks. Looking ahead into 
1973, another year of poor weather could bring very serious shortages, especially 
in the Indian subcontinent, in a world where stocks have been substantially reduced. 
In these circumstances, it is natural for the Foundation to ask how serious 
is the world food outlook, and what it suggests for the Foundation’s work in agriculture. 
This information paper addresses these questions. The paper is not based on extensive 
original fieldwork, but primarily on information available in Washington from U. S. 
Government and World Rank sources and in New York from regular reporting by our 
field offices. 
The Food Situation 
The events of recent months have emphasized powerfully how precarious is 
the margin between food requirements and supplies, and what large changes in prices, 
stocks, and international grain movements can result from relatively small changes 
in total production. Crops have been good in recent years including 1971/72 (inter- 
national statistics on crops are usually based on years ending June 30th). In 1972/73, 
however, food grain production is down, owing mainly to adverse weather in the USSR, 
late and insufficient monsoon rains in Asia, and drought in Australia. 
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Table 1 
World Grain Production and Stocks 
(millions of metric tons) 
Food Grains 
1969/70 1970/7 1 197 l/72 
Wheat production 287 291 323 301 
Wheat stocks, June 30, 
selected countries’) 69 53 49 32 
Milled rice production 206 203 200 
Coarse Grains2 
Coarse grain production 534 528 587 568 
Coarse grain stocks, June 30, 
selected countries’) 81 71 87 83 
Estimate 
1972/73 
-USA, Canada, Argentina, Australia - the major exporting countries. 
2Primarily maize, barley, sorghum and millets. 
Note: Table 1 is based on data compiled by the U. S. Department of Agriculture 
and the World Bank. The figures shown include China, and in this and 
other cases contain many uncertainties; they are undoubtedly more reliable 
as indicators of major trends than of precise totals. 
Total world production has fallen relatively little in the current year - wheat 
production an estimated seven percent, rice one to two percent, and coarse grains 
about three percent. But production is down sharply in key places - the Soviet Union’s 
wheat production from 99 million tons to 75 million tons; India’s total grain production 
from 105 million tons to about 95 million tons. And the coincidence of these large 
consumers suddenly needing to become large importers, with low output by some regular 
suppliers like Australia, has brought some startling results: 
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U. S. Export prices have risen sharply: wheat prices up 70 percent, rice 
and maize prices up 35 percent, and soybean prices more than doubled. 
- Carryover stocks are falling: wheat stocks in major exporting countries on 
June 30, 1973 are expected to be the lowest in 20 years. 
- International trade and transport capacities for grain are severely taxed: 
the Soviet Union alone has purchased 16 million tons of wheat from the United 
States, which is more than half the total international trade in wheat in a normal 
year. 
Is there a crisis? 
What do these recent events signify? Are they evidence of short-run problems, 
likely to be overcome in the near future, or of long-term disaster inexorably impending? 
The best judgments we can find among our own staff and in Washington converge on 
a consens us : it would be a mistake to give too much weight to the events of the last 
year. In all probability they are not evidence of a fundamental deterioration in the 
world food situation. What they suggest is what we have known all along, namely, 
that providing enough food for the world’s rapidly growing population is going to be 
a difficult and chancy matter for years to come, which will continue to require for 
solution more resources, brams, and attention than are currently being applied. 
The argument behind this conclusion runs as follows. Except for Africa, the 
period 1954-1972 showed an upward trend in the per capita production of food through- 
out most of the world. Food production per capita in developed regions increased 
about 1.5 percent annually, while the less developed regions experienced a much 
slower increase - less than half of one percent. But the difference was less a function 
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of food production than of the rapid rate of population growth in the less developed 
world. Food production in absolute terms in the less developed areas rose 2.7 percent 
per year - an impressive record, even though most of the increase was needed simply 
to feed more people. 
These figures demonstrate persuasively that production trends have been 
steadily upward over two decades. In historical terms, this is a major achievement. 
But it is far from reason for complacency, for two main reasons, 
First, the mere maintenance of per capita food production levels is not 
good enough . Malnutrition and hunger remain the state of existence for millions. To 
improve nutritional standards is far more than a problem of food production; it involves 
income, marketing, and other changes. But better nutrition in developing countries 
does require an increase in per capita food supply - and a shift toward higher quality 
foods. 
Second, the fact that production trends have been upward is no automatic 
guarantee that they will continue to rise. Indeed, there are elements in the situation 
which clearly make future production increases harder than past ones; the best land 
has been put to use, the handiest water supplies have been tapped, and so forth. 
Looking to the next two or three decades, therefore, one sees strongly rising 
food demands both from population growth (which cannot be slowed very much in this 
time period) and from income growth (low income people put a large share of any 
increased income into more and better food). How can these demands be met? 
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Requirements for increased food supplies 
In the very short run, substantial increases in supply can only come from the 
major food exporting countries and especially from the United States. For example, 
in 1973 an attempt is being made by the U. S. Government to bring back into production 
some 40 million acres which have been held out of production under government programs. 
If all this land were planted, which is not likely, it would increase cultivated acreage 
somewhat more than 10 percent (on a base of about 300 million acres), but it would 
not increase output as much as 10 percent since these are generally less productive lands. 
Production should rise in other developed countries as well in response to high 
market prices and a clear and present need. It is entirely possible, with average 
weather, that these reactions in the U. S. and elsewhere could lead to some rebuilding 
of stocks within a year or two, and that prices could drop as rapidly as they have risen. 
But it would be just as erroneous to interpret such an occurence as indicating a per- 
manent solution as to interpret the current difficulties as a total disaster. 
The fundamental point is that the food supply problem in the world is a long- 
term problem, which will be with us for the next two or three decades. Most of the 
food that will be needed must be produced in the less developed countries, and to achieve 
that will require hard, steady work, year after year, if there is to be hope of success. 
Looked at in this perspective, Foundation staff have felt for some years that 
enough food can be produced and distributed to meet the world’s needs over the coming 
years if: 
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1. Research and training related to agricultural production and improved 
farming systems are accelerated; 
2. Less -developed countries with good agricultural potential give high priority 
and take sustained and systematic action to increase agricultural output; 
3. External agencies give high priority and well-directed assistance to helping 
such nations raise food production; 
4. Emergency food needs of less developed countries are met by the maintenance 
of stocks in advanced countries which are made available when necessary through 
concessional sales or aid programs. 
Despite adverse weather in 1972 and less-than-favorable 1973 crop prospects 
in several regions, we continue to hold these views. We believe they are supported 
by the actual achievements of the past decade. 
Until the mid-1960’s, third world application of modern, science-based agricultural 
technology was largely confined to export and industrial crops. Work on rice in 
Asia (spearheaded by the International Rice Research Institute) and on wheat in Mexico 
(conducted by the Rockefeller Foundation-Government of Mexico program and its 
successor, the International Center for Maize and Wheat Improvement) demonstrated 
what multidisciplinary, mission-oriented food crop research and training could do. 
Barriers to increased yields were identified. New high-yielding varieties responsive 
to irrigation and fertilizers were created. Packages of practices were developed, 
tested, and adapted to local conditions. 
When research-based packages were available and backed wholeheartedly by 
governments (inputs made available, incentives provided, policies adjusted) the pro- 
duction phenomenon called the Green Revolution resulted. Attitudes toward agriculture, 
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especially in critical food-deficit areas of Asia, changed. The rural sector, long 
the despair of many development planners, was seen as a contributor to growth. 
Technological advance is no panacea. Once rural modernization is under- 
way, the difficult problems of income distribution which accompany agricultural 
change complicate the process. Structural and institutional changes are required. 
Rural development is much more than larger crop output. But technical advance is 
one essential for progress. 
From the physical resource viewpoint, the unexploited potential for increasing 
output in areas favorable to the new agricultural technology remains high. Increases 
in the acreage of high yielding varieties of wheat and rice, most of which are in Asia, 
are substantial as reflected in these estimates: 
Crop Year Estimated Acreage in High Yielding Varieties 
(millions of acres) 
Wheat Tot al 
1966/67 1.5 2.5 4.0 
1967/68 10.2 6.5 16.7 
1968/69 19.7 11.6 31.3 
1969170 21.6 19.1 40.7 
1970/71 21.2 25.3 46.6 
But much remains to be done. In 1970/71 it is estimated that the percentage of wheat 
acreage seeded to high yielding varieties was very high in Mexico, about half in 
Pakistan, one-third in India, and less than 10 percent in most of the other developing 
nations where wheat is important. A similar spread existed for rice. The estimated 
percentages of the rice acreage on which high yielding varieties were grown were 50 in 
the Philippines, 42 in Pakistan, 24 in West Malaysia, 19 in South Vietnam, 14 in India, 
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11 in Indonesia, and under 10 in other rice-growing developing nations studied. 
Superior high yielding varieties are only now being developed for production under 
rainfed conditions. The most rapid increase in the use of improved varieties has, 
therefore, come where adequate moisture is assured. 
Improvement of productivity in poorer areas with inadequate or excessive 
moisture, limiting temperatures, slope and soil problems, is difficult and time- 
consuming but not impossible. Important lessons have been learned about improved 
research and dissemination techniques. Two new institutional forms, the international 
agricultural research and training institute and the Consultative Group for Agricultural 
Research, have been created. These institutions and their collaborators can sustain 
technical advances with crops on which breakthroughs have already been made; they 
should be able to speed progress with other cereals, food legumes, roots and tubers, 
and lives tack. 
The second requirement for sustained progress - national policies and action 
programs in developing countries - likewise shows some gains in the last decade. 
When the wheat and rice breakthroughs began to occur in the middle 1960’s, many 
governments radically revised their view of the agricultural sector as part of national 
development efforts. India, the Philippines, Tunisia, and Pakistan are among the 
countries that began to give much higher priority to agricultural programs. 
The actual advances made in most countries, however, in establishing strong 
policy analysis systems, in enlarging research, demonstration, and extension services, 
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above all in developing a sustained political commitment to rural change, are still 
very small in relation to what is needed. And the very success of the early high 
yielding varieties may have worked against a correct response in. some countries 
because it made sustained progress seem misleadingly easy. 
Foreign assistance for agricultural improvement has been given high priority 
by most aid agencies for many years, and much valuable help has been provided. 
The impressions of Foundation staff, however - and unfortunately impressions are 
about all one has to go on since there is little reliable published evaluation of aid ac- 
tivities - suggest serious defects in most aid for agriculture. Far too little attention 
has been given to supporting research, and despite recent gains such as the establish- 
ment of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research this is still 
generally true. Even less attention has been given to the crucial area of public policy 
analysis, where external agencies necessarily must play a secondary role but where 
they can do much to help build the underlying skills of statistics, agricultural economics, 
rural sociology, etc. , and to assist in establishing the institutions through which such 
skills can be brought to bear on policy issues. These impressions of where external 
programs have been weakest have much to do-with the Foundation’s own sense of program 
priorities, discussed below. 
Finally, the record of the past decade has been encouraging with respect to 
providinxfor food needs in emergencies. -..-. In many countries and in varying degrees 
of emergency, food assistance has been provided, mostly by the United States, 
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sufficient to prevent serious famine - although far from sufficient, of course, to 
avoid much hunger and malnutrition. Perhaps the most difficult case was that of 
India in 1965-67, when two bad monsoons in a row resulted in a very serious situation. 
External assistance was (barely) enough to carry India through, and the memory of 
that successful passage no doubt underlies the sense of confidence one finds in many 
quarters today as current difficulties are discussed. 
Foundation staff are less sure that the world’s arrangements for dealing with 
food emergencies are in good order. The world market for agricultural commodities 
is clearly imperfect and, as recent events have shown, subject to violent and sudden 
price increases, misallocated supplies, and clogged transport capacity - all of which 
can result in great human damage. 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether the vulnerability to emergencies is rising 
or falling. Little is understood about the world’s weather, and the coincidence of 
droughts in 1972 may or may not be accidental and temporary. As great reliance is 
placed on a few highly productive grain varieties, the world is susceptible to short- 
range crop damage from previously minor insects or diseases - as in the case of the 
U. S. corn blight in 1970. 
Finally, the availability of U. S. grain stocks - and expansible productive capac- 
ity - has been the partly fortuitous result of domestic American politics which allowed 
us to meet needs abroad while helping our commercial farmers (at not inconsiderable 
expense to the general taxpayer). Whether this system will survive the steady attrition of 
rural political power in the U. S,, and the scrutiny of an economy-minded Administration, 
., 
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remains to be seen. And what would replace it if it goes is not at all clear. 
It seems to us, therefore, that it is not wise to assume that the arrangements 
that have brought the world through emergency situations in the recent past will 
suffice for the future. More attention should be paid to this subject. The implications 
of this conclusion for the Foundation are discussed later in this memorandum. 
The Case of India 
All these various aspects of the food problem can be illustrated in their 
impact on India. Food grain production dropped from a record 109 million tons in 
1970/71 to 105 million tons in 1971/72, with a further decline expected to about 95 
million tons in 1972/73. The latest drop has not been in wheat, which has held up 
quite well, but about 3 million tons in rice and the balance mostly in millets and 
sorghums. 
The reversal of trend has been sudden and serious. India’s fourth Plan 
envisaged a 5 percent annual growth rate in agricultural output, which rate was in fact 
achieved in the first two years of the Plan, 1969/70 and 1970/71. Buffer stocks were 
built up to an estimated 9 million tons. And all this led to an attitude in the Indian 
Government which it would probably exaggerate to call complacent, but certainly was 
one of much less concern and urgency about agriculture than had been the case in 
the middle 1960’s. 
Perhaps in consequence, Government reaction to the recent drop in production 
has had more of an air of improvisation than would have been desirable. of the 
buffer stocks, about two million tons had been used in feeding the refugees from 
Bangladesh; most of the balance has been distributed in recent months to meet needs 
and to slow rapidly rising consumer prices. By the time the inadequacy of domestic 
production plus stocks was realized, available world supplies had been heavily 
committed to the Soviet Union and prices had jumped. Consequently, the 2 million 
tons India has now purchased for import are costing around $200 million, a huge burden 
on India’s modest foreign exchange earnings. 
What is the outlook? Including anticipated imports, per capita food availability 
in India for 1972/73 is expected to approximate minimal levels that prevailed during 
the drouth crisis of 1966/67. There is plainly a bleak period immediately ahead, 
Moreover a second poor monsoon is entirely possible, and if it came the situation 
in India could be very dangerous. 
Looking beyond the immediate period in which the vagaries of the weather are 
so vital, the longer-term outlook for food production in India is for a continuing 
struggle to stay ahead of domestic demand. There are many visible opportunities 
for improving production technology but the long-range outlook shows two big technical 
uncertainties. One is that so far research has not brought for rice in India the same 
sharp breakthrough in yields that has occurred for wheat. The second is that many 
qualified experts - notably David Hopper, head of the Canadian International Develop- 
ment Research Centre - believe the next major problem for Indian agriculture is to 
bring more water under control and increase the efficiency of its use, since the high- 
yielding fertilizer-intensive varieties depend heavily on water. 
Beyond technology, the uncertainties loom if anything larger. The record of 
Indian policy-making in economic development is uneven. In earlier years, 
agriculture was slighted and industrialization was understood primarily to mean 
heavy industries, not modernized agriculture. There are a number of outstanding 
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Indian biological and social scientists concerned with agriculture, but against a rea- 
sonable standard of what is needed, one would have to say that India has seriously 
insufficient numbers of agricultural economists and rural sociologists, only one or two 
outstanding centers of research and analysis concerned with agricultural problems, and 
State and Central Ministries of Agriculture which have been bureaucratic and slow-moving. 
AI1 this is intended to assert that the problem is long-term and difficult, 
not that progress is impossible. One must never forget that in spite of all the problems, 
Indian agricultural production has risen at about 2.5 percent per year for the last 20 
years, which is impressive testimony to the underlying vigor of Indian farmers and 
the often-overlooked resilience of the Indian economy. 
The Foundation’s Work in Agriculture 
In recent years, the Foundation’s agricultural activities have tended to focus 
mainly on two objectives: (1) improving agricultural production research and training, 
and (2) strengthening the capacity of developing nations for agricultural policy analysis, 
planning, and management. 
Production Technology. For the last decade, the Foundation’s support for 
research and training aimed at improved production technology has emphasized the 
international agricultural research centers. Trustees are familiar with the successive 
initiatives which led to IRRI, CIMMYT, IITA, and CIAT, all now fully operative 
although the two last only beginning to produce research results. They may be less 
familiar with the fast-moving changes of the past two years, during which the 
Consultative Group on International AgriculturaI Research was established by initiative 
of the World Bank, the FAO, and the UNDP. The Group now has 28 members of which 
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a dozen are aid-giving nations; others include the three sponsors, regional banks, the 
Ford, Rockefeller, and Kellogg Foundations, and five representatives of developing 
countries. The Group is raising this year about $24 million for the operating and 
capital costs of six international centers. 
The Consultative Group is a highly welcome and thus far very effective arrange- 
ment for raising more money for high-quality research and training. At the same 
time, it is a novel instrument which still presents many unanswered questions. 
Perhaps chief among them is the question how to ensure continued high quality scien- 
tific performance by the international centers, while accommodating the vsri ed 
interests and bureaucratic procedures that inevitably characterize the Consultative 
Group and its multiple membership. (A summary of the current situation of the 
Centers is attached as Annex A. ) 
The Foundation’s annual commitment to the continued costs of the international 
centers is $3 million. At present, the Foundation devotes about another $5 million 
per year to other activities intended to help generate, test, adapt, and place into use 
improved production techniques. The largest share of these funds goes to help upgrade 
the quality of national agricultural research and training activities, usually by linking 
them with one or more of the international centers - as, for example, in the IRRI- 
Bangladesh project to establish a Bangladesh Rice Research Institute. In the Middle 
East, because of the diversity and number of countries, the Foundation has established 
a special organization - the Arid Lands Agricultural Development program - which is 
working to raise the quality of research and of production technology in a major part 
of the region. 
--El- 
Policy Analysis. A second main theme of the Foundation’s work in agri- __-_. .--- 
culture is to help strengthen the capacity of less developed countries for agricultural 
policy analysis, planning and management. About $3 million is currently devoted to 
these purposes annually, the largest share used to support the training of agricultural 
economists and other social scientists whose work is relevant to agricultural policy. 
We are engaged in a number of countries in helping to establish local training programs, 
mostly at the M. A. level and mostly in agricultural economics. In addition to training 
programs, we are supporting in a variety of ways the establishment of institutional 
arrangements, in governments and out, for applying research and analytical skills 
to policy issues, and for communicating the findings to policy-makers. 
With the rise of local skills for policy-oriented research, it begins to be important 
to help link research groups in different developing countries with each other and with 
those in the advanced countries; the Foundation increasingly supports efforts of varying 
degrees of formality to build such international %etworks.l’ Within various less 
developed countries, we are also seeing more attention given by the Foundation to 
research and planning for small rural areas, and to the intractable problems of small 
holders and other less advantaged farmers. 
Do these priorities stand up in the light of the current world food situation? 
In general, we think they stand up very well. Better production technology, and better 
national policies and action programs, are crucial to the improvement of world food 
supplies, and the Foundation’s activities considered in the broad or in detail seem 
to be well designed and of high quality. The principal change we would like to make 
is to put gradually greater emphasis on the policy and management side, where we 
believe the Foundation because of its non-political, professional character has a 
special comparative advantage. In logic, it should be easier for national and inter- 
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national aid agencies to support research and -training on production technology, 
and through the Consultative Group and in other ways they are in fact enlarging their 
contribution. It remains to be seen, however, whether and how soon this will permit 
the Foundation gradually to reduce its budget for this purpose. 
An additio.nal need? While the present review confirms, in our opinion, 
our present ag&ultural priorities, it also suggests that serious work is nReded in 
an addUional field. This is the development of better international arrangements 
for gathering and analyzing agricultural outlook data. This is not a simple problem 
inthe technical sense. It is even more complex politically, since crop production 
data are normally reported by governments, and their official reports may be 
designed to confirm plan targets or political pledges. The truth of the situation, if 
known, may be recorded in a second, unavailable set of books, 
Nevertheless, the importance of improved agricultural intelligence could 
be very large. National decisions could be made more rationally if based on current, 
accurate data for different agro-climatic regions covering such matters as crop 
prospects, storage stocks, and the likely availability and price of essential inputs - 
seeds, fertilizers, plant protection materials, fuel, etc. Such data would also be 
essential if the larger world community is to move, as it should, toward more rational 
methods for anticipating and dealing with emergency food needs. 
We believe, therefore, that we should explore over the next few months 
what might be done in this field and by whom. In some ways, the situation is propitious 
for change. There is growing scientific capacity through remote sensing to monitor 
crop conditions and provide current progress reports. Moreover the reminder, as 
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a result of the 1972 events, that the threat of famine has not been eliminated, may 
encourage cooperative attitudes. 
It is by no means clear that exploration of this field will lead to major 
program activities for the Foundation. The FAO, the World Bank, and others should 
in logic be the prime movers. They .confront political constraints, however, which 
private efforts may be able to bypass at least in part. A modest exploration of this 
need is therefore proposed. Results of this exploration will be reported in due course. 
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Annendix A 
The International Agricultural Centers 
An international agricultural research center is an organization 
specially created and funded by donor groups from developed countries working 
in collaboration with a host government. It is dedicated to the solution of im- 
portant agricultural production problems in the less developed parts of the world. 
The rationale for forming this new research mechanism rests on the following 
premises : 
1. Increasing the quantity, quality and efficiency of food production 
is of great urgency in the major parts of the developing world. 
2. Scientific and technical knowledge is a major resource for in- 
creasing agricultural production. In view of the relatively high social rates of 
return to research, there is a substantial underinvestment of resources in this 
activity. 
3. The supply of quality scientific research talent in developing 
countries is sharply limited. The effective demand for agricultural research is 
also relatively low, in large measure because of inadequate demonstration of 
what modern science and technology can contribute. 
4. While it is the responsibility of the individual countries to adapt 
research for local conditions and devise policy measures to encourage its ac- 
ceptance, there are training and research objectives common to a number of 
countries which can be best accomplished by collective effort. 
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5. Directed investigations by mission-oriented research institutions 
such as IRRI and CIMMYT can produce solutions to consequential problems more 
rapidly than would otherwise o&r. The effectiveness of researchers in such insti- 
tutions is significantlv enhanced by collaboration with scientists in advanced countries 
including those working on fundamental biological processes. 
6. A minimum critical mass is required for problem-solving re- 
search. Economies of scale exist in research organizations. Typically, the 
developing countries themselves are unable as yet to bring the necessary crit- 
ical mass of scientific talent to bear on agricultural production technology 
research. 
Translation of the foregoing premises into operational programs has 
resulted in the creation and support of institutions of several types. The classic 
center of limited commodity coverage is characterized by the operations of IRRI 
and CIMMYT. Newer centers have taken on broader mandates. These include 
the development of total land use and farming systems required to meet future 
food needs consistent with a stable, non-exploitative agriculture. 
Center Financial and Managerial Backstopping in Transition 
During the past four years the foundations have helped in the forma- 
tion of an institutional framework on the donor side which permits collaboration 
in multicountry efforts to assist the advance of agricultural research. Only a 
very informal procedure was required when the assistance was limited to the 
Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. Relationships between the centers and the 
foundations were close. Foundation staff members were deputed to the centers 
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where they occupied key positions. Host countries had confidence in and under- 
stood the arrangements and the role of the foundations in the venture. Staff 
members felt they had the direct professional and financial backstopping of the 
foundations. The design permitted the critical mass of first-class scientists 
to get on with their research and training. 
The two foundations in 1973, however, will contribute only about one- 
quarter of the annual operating and capital costs of the six institutes -- $6 million 
of a total of about $24 million. (Financial arrangements and program thrusts of 
the six institutes are described in Tables A-l and A-2. ) The broadened entre- 
preneurial , managerial and financial support of the centers is now provided by a 
new organization created for that purpose -- the Consultative Group for Inter- 
national Agricultural Research (CG). 
With the inclusion of a larger number of donor agencies interested in 
and willing to support international agricultural research, the decision-making 
and coordinating procedures for the allocation of resources become considerably 
more complicated. The objective of maintaining an optimal situation in which 
superior scientists can produce is unchanged. The basic notion is relatively 
simple. The CG as a body evolves policies and procedures for the support of the 
set of institutions for which responsibility is accepted. Since donor members 
make bilateral grants to individual centers, much depends on the ability of the 
multinational forum provided by the CG to reach equitable and satisfactory de- 
cisions on collective purposes and means for coordinating the individual actions. 
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The institutional structure on the donor side has been expanded to 
include a secretariat for the CG manned by staff of the World Bank, and a 
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), consisting of 12 scientists (six of whom 
are from developing countries) and the chairman, Sir John Crawford of Australia, 
with its secretariat provided by FAO. The TAC advises the CC on main gaps and 
priorities in agricultural research relating to the developing countries, both in 
the technical and socio-economic fields, helps evaluate existing programs and 
proposed new ventures, and makes recommendations to the CG, 
The role of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations in the development and 
current operations of the centers is greater than their recurring grants of $3 million 
per year may suggest. The Ford Foundation financed most of the construction of 
IRRI ($7.5 million) and IITA ($17 million); the Rockefeller Foundation has provided 
major funding for the physical plants at CIMMYT and CIAT. Rockefeller and Ford 
Foundation staff have helped form the nucleus of scientific and managerial talent in 
several of the centers. New York-based-foundation staff serve on the Governing 
Boards and Executive Committees of most of the institutes. In addition, other 
offices in the foundations -- purchasing, finance, personnel and legal counsel, for 
example -- have directly assisted the centers. 
As the foregoing suggests, the Ford Foundation’s relationship to the 
centers, like that of the’Rockefeller Foundation, is a special one. Governing boards 
of the centers indicate that our professional backstopping is fully as important as 
is our financial input. Given satisfactory performance, we are committed to ongoing 
support to the core budgets of the centers on the order of $3 million annually. Cur 
review procedures are such that we make our forward commitments to individual 
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centers for periods of around five years. The institutes and other members of 
the CG understand that our level of input to individual centers may vary accord- 
ing to need and the support available from other donors -- up to the $3 million 
total. It is our impression that our commitment to ongoing support, which is 
subject to annual evaluation and review, has contributed positively to the broad- 
ened base for center funding that is now developing. 
One can well ask, have the sponsors helped create in the institutes 
a group of dependent organizations ? The answer is yes, but we believe that the 
support base is now sufficiently broad as to make the risk to the centers and 
donors manageable. Obviously these institutions would not have come to their 
present size or number without the prior commitment of a substantial group of 
donors. But the international centers are clearly dependent on ongoing funding 
from external donors including the Foundation. Any substantial core budget 
support from the developing nations is probably 10 or more years away. 
Foundation staff are involved in the management of the institutes at 
the policy level through their membership on governing boards. This is largely 
an historical evolution continued at the insistence of the developing nations who 
see the foundations as a force for continuity and non-political judgments. Staying 
power of the foundations is, to our view, especially important to the productivity 
of the institutes during the next five years or so. In this period the evolution of 
CG procedures and the transition to CG backstopping should be completed. 
In our judgment the institutional experiment involving the centers and 
the Consultative Group has significance over and above problem-solving in 
agricultural development. If such new institutional forms can in fact be created 
I -23- 
and made viable, the world may have a model  which can be used in helping to 
resolve other important problems . Some of the experience thus far acquired 
in agriculture has in fact already been fed into new initiatives in the fields of 
population and education. 
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TABLE A-l 
Indications of Financing of 
International Agricultural Centers for 1973 
(Thousands of Dollars) 
Indicated Sources and Allocation of Funds 
Donor Total ClAT CIMMYT CIP ICRISAT IITA IR RI 
Australia 
Belgium 130 
Canada 1,900 
Denmark 250 
Ford 3,000 
Germany 2,215 
IDRC 550 
Japan 265 
Kellogg 290 
Netherlands 430 
Norway 150 
Rockefeller 3,425 
Swedep 1,150 
Switzerland 260 
U, K. 1,175 
UNDP 1,200 
u. s. 5,385 
W o rld Bank Group 3,000 
500 450 200 
170 
750 750 
280 80 355 
280 
130 
750 
750 
750 
80 
750 
750 
150 120 
265 
290 
125 180 125 
150 
1,400 
65 
875 
150 
750 
700 
1,500 
1,000 
140 
150 
65 
50 
340 
515 620 
1,000 
130 
235 
500 
745 
545 
1,200 
750 
345 
725 
120 980 
To be 
Allocated 
Total 24,775 4,155 5,430 1,375 3,395 5,515 2,975 1,930 
Estimated Financial Requirements of the Centers 
Estimated 
oore budget 18,373 3,567 5,172 1,085 1,200 4,549 2,800 
Estimated 
capital needs 5,301 718 1,198 289 1,790 1,070 236 
Estimated 
Requigements 
(Net) -.I 23,115 4,220 6,125 1,375 2,990 5,510 2,895 
Execution of these contributions is subject in many cases to approval by governing bodies 
or other authorities of the donors concerned. 
2/ - Core operating budget plus capital less adjustment for earned income from sale of produce, 
servicing of special projects. 
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1. 
TABLE A-2 
Program Thrusts of Six Existing International 
Agricultural Research and Training Centers 
__- _--- 
Institution - 
IRRI 
(International Rice 
Research Institute) 
Philippines 
CIMMYT 
(International Maize and 
Wheat Improvement Center) 
Mexico 
CTAT 
(International Center of 
Tropical Agriculture) 
Colombia 
IITA 
(International Institute of 
Tropical Agriculture) 
Niger ia 
International Leadership 
Responsibility 
Rice production. 
Wheat (spring, durum Low- temperature 
and triticales). sorghum 
Maize Barley 
Forage-beef production 
systems in lowland tropics. 
Cas sava 
Alternatives to and improvements 
in the shifting cultivation system 
of agriculture in the humid tropics. 
Cowpeas, Yams 
CIP 
(International Potato Center) 
Peru 
Potato production, 
Regional “Relay” 
Responsibility 
Cropping systems 
centered on rice. 
Cereals (maize, 
rice) 
Swine 
Field beans 
Agricultural systems 
Cereals (maize, 
rice) 
Food legumes 
(soybeans, 
pigeon peas) 
Roots and tubers 
(cassava, 
sweet potatoes) 
ICRISAT 
(International Crops Research 
Institute for the Semi-Arid 
Tropics) 
India 
Grain sorghums (food and feed) 
Millets 
Pigeon peas 
Chick peas 
Cropping systems 
in the semi-arid 
tropics 
